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Wage Boards for the 21st Century: Revisiting Sectoral Standard-Setting 
Mechanisms for the Workplace 
Sara Slinn * 
 
 
As existing labour relations and minimum standards regulatory systems have continued to struggle 
to ensure acceptable worker voice and workplace standards, attention has increasingly turned to whether 
broader-based or sectoral approaches can offer solutions. Broader-based or sectoral approaches can be 
understood as falling into three categories of models: multi-employer, juridical extension, and sectoral 
standard-setting models. A key difference among these is that the first two categories involve not only 
collective representation of workers but also collective bargaining; the third model – sectoral standard-
setting – involves a form of collective representation, but does not involve collective bargaining, which is 
characterized by compelled recognition, a duty to bargain in good faith, and a duty of fair representation 
borne by employee representatives. Instead, sectoral standard-setting models involve forms of negotiation 
and consultation.   
In the early 20th century, several countries established statutory systems of sector-based minimum 
workplace standard-setting as a response to unacceptable wages and working conditions.1 Key examples 
are the British Wages Council system (which developed from the Trade Boards Act, 1909), the 1934 
Industrial Standards Act (ISA) established in the Canadian province of Ontario, and the 1938 federal United 
States Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).2 Although these three statutory systems arose out of broadly 
similar social and economic concerns, they reflect different conceptions or applications of tripartism, 
different perspectives on the role of voluntarism and collective representation and bargaining, and different 
approaches to sectoral workplace standard-setting. These systems also share important commonalities: all 
had roots in combatting sweated labour, characterized by fragmented and scattered workplaces and 
unacceptable remuneration and conditions of work, where – partly due to the characteristics of the work, 
workers and employers in these sectors – no voluntary collective negotiations could take root. These 
circumstances have clear parallels to today’s work and economy. 
This article examines these three systems, at the point at which each regime provided the most 
robust sectoral standard-setting procedure, as informative examples of a spectrum of approaches to tripartite 
                                                            
* Associate Professor & Associate Dean (Research & Institutional Relations), Osgoode Hall Law School, York 
University, Toronto.  
1 These were not the first instances of sectoral standard-setting legislation: New Zealand and Australia, for instance, 
had adopted such legislation in the 19th century. However, these earlier examples are not addressed in this article.   
2 Trade Boards Act 1909, 8 Edw. 7 – 9 Edw. 7, c. 22, § 3 (Gr. Brit.) [TBA]; Ontario Industrial Standards Act 1935, 





sectoral workplace standard-setting. Out of this comparison, this article then offers some considerations for 
a modern approach to sectoral workplace standard-setting.3 
I.  Statutory Sectoral Standard-Setting Systems 
A.  British Wages Councils 
Wages Council legislation underwent numerous amendments between its initial introduction in the early 
20th century and its repeal and simultaneous abolition of existing councils in the early 1990s.4 This paper 
examines the Wages Council system as it existed under the Wages Councils Act 1979, c. 12, (“WCA”) 
which represents the zenith of this system – the point at which Wages Councils had broadest application 
and greatest authority over terms and conditions of work. The Wages Council system was ultimately 
repealed, and wages councils mostly abolished in 1993 by the Thatcher government. Essentially the wages 
council system was replaced by national minimum wage legislation in 1998.5 
Wages Councils were tripartite bodies composed of independent members, in addition to equal 
numbers of representative members appointed by employers and by employees, responsible for establishing 
sector-wide minimum wages and an array of terms and conditions of work.6 The WCA had its origins in 
the Trade Boards Act, 1909, a product of the anti-sweating movement, and out of which the Wages Councils 
system developed, permitted the government’s Board of Trade to establish a board in any industry where 
wages were “exceptionally low compared with that in other employments”.7 The Trade Board Act 
underwent several amendments and a significant reorientation towards regarding trade boards as temporary 
structures which would develop into and be replaced by joint industrial councils and voluntary collective 
bargaining once the parties had developed the capacity to do so. As described by one commentator: “One 
of the objects of wages councils legislation has always been to stimulate collective bargaining, to provide 
a training ground for voluntary procedure, and to this extent to make the statutory procedure superfluous.”8  
The Wages Council Act 1945 repealed the Trade Boards Acts of 1909 and 1918, renamed trade 
boards as “wages councils”, and introduced several changes to the system, but reaffirmed and the role of 
wages councils as, essentially, filling a gap where voluntary collective bargaining had failed to emerge, and 
extending this role to supporting inadequate bargaining machinery.9  
                                                            
3 For the British Wages Council system, this is as it existed under the Wages Councils Act 1979, 27 Eliz. 2 – 28 Eliz. 2, 
c. 12 (Gr. Brit.) [WCA]; for the Ontario ISA, as it existed at the time it was repealed in 2001; and, for the FLSA, as it 
was first enacted in 1938. 
4 Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993, 41 Eliz. 2 – 42 Eliz. 2, c. 19, § 50, sch. 9. Note that, in 
addition to the WCA, wages councils existed specific to agriculture (Agricultural Wages Act 1948, 12 Geo. 6 – 13 
Geo. 6, c. 47, § 17 and the Agricultural Wages (Scotland) Act 1949, 13 Geo. 6 – 14 Geo. 6, c. 30, § 2), and also 
ultimately abolished, although not until two decades later (Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, 61 Eliz. 2 – 
62 Eliz. 2, c. 24, § 72). However, agricultural wages councils are not considered here: these had analogous structures 
and virtually the same powers as councils established under the WCA.  
5 DOUG PYPER, BUSINESS AND TRANSPORT SECTION, THE NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 3 
(2014). The remaining Agricultural Wages Board, established under that industry-specific wages council legislation, 
remained in existence until its abolition in 2013. 
6 WCA 1979, supra note 3, § 1 and Sched. 2.  
7 TBA 1909, supra note 2, § 1(2). 
8 OTTO KAHN-FREUND ET AL., KAHN-FREUND'S LABOUR AND THE LAW 188 (1983). 
9 Simon Deakin & Francis Green, One hundred years of British minimum wage legislation, 47 Brit. J. of Indus. Rel. 





Ultimately, under the 1979 Wages Council Act, there were three alternative routes under which the 
Secretary of State (“SOS”) could decide to order that a wages council be established, including on the 
SOS’s initiative or on application by a joint industrial council or jointly by worker and employer 
organizations.10 The overarching theme was that minimum standards were to be set by a wages council only 
where workers in the sector require a mandated floor, and this is achieved through the different statutory 
tests applying to each of the three routes: 
(1) The most common path to establishment of a wages council was initiated by the SOS where, in 
his or her opinion (Labour 1961, rev'd. 1964, 155): 
[N]o adequate machinery exists for the effective regulation of the remuneration of any workers 
or the existing machinery is likely to cease to exist or be adequate for that purpose and a 
reasonable standard of remuneration among those workers will not be maintained…. 
The SOS could then refer to the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS),11 the 
question of whether to establish a wages council. Then, the SOS “if he thinks fit, may on his own 
motion” choose to give effect to ACAS’ recommendation.12   
(2) The SOS could also initiate establishment of a wages council where, in his or her opinion: 
[N]o adequate statutory machinery exists for the effective regulation of the remuneration of 
the workers described in the order and that, having regard to the remuneration existing among 
those workers, or any of them, it is expedient that such a council should be established.13    
(3) As a final alternative, organizations of employers and workers, which had routinely participated 
in the settling wages and conditions of employment in a sector, could jointly apply to the SOS, as 
could a Joint Industrial Council or another similar body.14 These applications had to be made on 
the ground that: 
[T]hat the existing machinery for the settlement of remuneration and conditions of employment 
for those workers is likely to cease to exist or be adequate for the purpose.15  
If the SOS was of the opinion that: 
[N]o adequate machinery exists for the effective regulation of the remuneration of any workers 
or the existing machinery is likely to cease to exist or be adequate for that purpose and a 
reasonable standard of remuneration among those workers will not be maintained…. 
The SOS then could then refer to ACAS the question of whether a wages council should be 
established and could decide to give effect to ACAS recommendations.16   
                                                            
10 WCA 1979, supra note 3, § 1. 
11 ACAS is a government funded, independent, statutory body providing conciliation services and advice and guidance 
on workplace issues. 
12 WCA 1979, supra note 3, §§ 1(1)(c), 3. 
13 Id. § 1(2)(a). 
14 Id. §§ 1(2)(b), 2(1)(a), (b). 
15 Id. § 2(1). 





The WCA covered “workers”, broadly defined to include both contracts of and for service17, apprenticeship, 
and “any other contract whereby [the person] undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services 
for another party to the contract who is not a professional client of [the person]”. Homeworkers were 
explicitly included, regardless of whether they met the above descriptions; however, casual employment 
and employment for purpose other than that of the employer’s business, were excluded.18 
Wages councils were tripartite bodies, composed of equal numbers of worker and employer 
representatives and up to three independent members. Council members were appointed for five-year terms 
and the SOS provided funding to pay members such remuneration, travelling and other allowances 
determined by the SOS and government.19 While the SOS determined the numbers of representatives, 
employers’ associations and unions directly appointed individuals to fill those positions.20 The SOS decided 
the number of independents and appointed these members, including appointing one independent member 
to act as chair of the Council.21  
Independents were intended to operate as tie-breakers should employer and worker representatives 
reach deadlock.22 As described below, the voting procedures established by regulation and applied in wage 
council decision-making reflects and reinforces this intended role for independents. Independents were 
apparently typically academics and lawyers rather than industry experts.23 Incorporation of independent 
members has been described as the “chief distinctive feature” of wages councils and the predecessor trade 
boards, and a key reason for councils’ successful operation.24  
The WCA granted wages councils authority to make orders setting remuneration, holidays and 
other terms and conditions for all or any of the workers within the council’s field of operation, although 
some restrictions existed relating to holidays.25 Therefore, unlike other sectoral standard-setting bodies, 
wages councils did not merely make recommendations to the government and, in this regard, they exercised 
tremendous autonomy.  However, the SOS did have authority to, at any time, issue an order varying the 
field of operation of a wages council.26  
Prior to making an order, a council was required to “make such investigations as it thinks fit”, to 
publish and give notice “for the purpose of informing, so far as practicable, all persons affected” of its 
proposals, and to consider any written representations regarding proposals.27 Further publication and notice 
                                                            
17 This would likely encompass what, in Canadian labour and employment law, we would classify as “employees”, 
“dependent contractors” and “independent contractors”. 
18 WCA 1979, supra note 3, § 28. 
19 Id. Sched. 2, §§ 8(1), 9. 
20 Id. §§1(2)–(5). Prior to 1975, representative members were nominated by employer and employee organizations but 
appointed by the SOS.  
21 Id. Schedule 2, § 1(1), (6). 
22 FREDERIC JOSEPH BAYLISS, BRITISH WAGES COUNCILS 2 (1962); KAHN-FREUND, supra note 8, at 185. 
23 KAHN-FREUND, id. 
24 BAYLISS, supra note 22, at 1, 2.  
25 Id. §§ 1(1), 14. Some statutory restrictions existed on orders relating to holidays: id. § 1(2)–(3).  
Notably, although earlier legislation provided only for authority to set “wages”, over time the statutory scope of wages 
councils’ authority grew as the term “wages” was replaced by “remuneration” and then to include holidays and holiday 
remuneration, and then to include other terms and conditions of employment (Wages Councils Act 1959, 7 Eliz. 2 – 8 
Eliz. 2, c. 69, § 11). 
26 WCA 1979, supra note 3, § 4(2). 





of any modifications to proposals would be given where the council modified its proposals and “it appears 
to the councils that, having regard to the nature of any proposed modifications, an opportunity should be 
given to persons concerned to consider the modifications”.28 Where a council made an order, giving effect 
to a proposal, notice of the order was to be given to all persons affected by it, “as far as practicable”.29  
Wages councils’ orders, reportedly, were based on comparisons with bargained outcomes for similar 
services in other industries, rather than on abstract assessments of minimum standards.30  
Wages councils made decisions regarding orders by vote, and the determined their own procedures, 
except where the WCA or regulations provided otherwise.31 Regulations stipulated that each council 
member had one vote, and provided that either if the chair decided, or more than half the representative 
members for employers or workers requested, then a “voting by sides” procedure would be followed. Under 
this procedure the majority of members’ votes on each of the employer and worker “sides” will determine 
the vote of that side. Independent members would then only vote where the two sides disagree.32 Orders 
were legally enforceable, subject to government inspections and the potential for criminal prosecution.33 In 
addition, terms of orders were implied into contracts of employment and, therefore, could also be enforced 
through civil actions.34   
Wages councils were not, however, intended to be permanent bodies. Reflecting the long-standing 
philosophy that wages councils were to be temporary solutions to a lack of collective bargaining, or supports 
to faltering collective bargaining, the WCA provided for abolition of wages councils in certain 
circumstances.  
A wages council could be abolished in one of two ways. First, the SOS could order that a wages council be 
abolished, on his own motion, and could refer the question to the ACAS of whether it should be abolished 
or its field of operation varied, and the ACAS may make investigations.35 In such cases the SOS was 
required to refer the question to ACAS of whether the wages council should be abolished or its field of 
operation varied.36  Alternatively, the SOS could order that a wages council be abolished where the SOS 
has received an application from either: organizations of works and organizations of employers, jointly 
(s.5(1)(b)); any organization of workers (s. 5(1)(c)); or, a joint industrial council, conciliation board or other 
similar body of workers or employers(9s.5(1)(a)), where the applicant “represents a substantial proportion 
of the workers with respect to whom that wages council operates” and on the grounds “that the existence 
of a wages council is no longer necessary for the purpose of maintaining a reasonable standard of 
remuneration for the workers with respect to whom that wages council operates.”37 Here, the SOS was not 
required, but could choose, whether to refer the abolition or variance of field of operation questions to 
ACAS.38 
                                                            
28 Id. § 14(4)–(6). 
29 Id. §14(9). 
30 Deakin and Green, supra note 9,  at 207. 
31 WCA 1979, supra note 3, Sched. 2, § 7. 
32 Wages Councils (Meetings and Procedure) Regulations 1975, 1975 No. 2136, § 3 (Gr. Brit.). 
33 WCA 1979, supra note 3, § 15 and Part IV (§§ 21–24). 
34 Employment Protection Act 1975, 1975 c. 71, § 109(8)(a), (b) (Gr. Brit.) [EPA]. 
35 WCA 1979, supra note 3, §§ 4(1)(b), 6, 7. 
36 Id. §§ 4(1)(b), 6, 7. 
37 Id. § 4(1)(a), 5–7. 





In addition, amendments to the WCA by the Employment Protection Act 1975 created what has been 
labeled a “half way house” to collective bargaining: statutory joint industrial councils.39 The SOS could 
order that a wages council become a JIC, and having the functions set out in Part III of the WCA (that is, 
the same powers as a wages council to make orders regulating terms and conditions of work).40 Described 
as “a hybrid creature, sharing some features with a statutory wages council and some with a voluntary 
negotiating body” JICs were composed of employer and employee representatives (no independent 
members), but had authority to issue enforceable orders as did wages councils.41 JICs could request 
assistance from ACAS, to essentially act as independents would act in a wages council, if it could not settle 
a matter. However, statutory JICs, themselves, were also intended to be temporary, to be abolished once 
employers and employees were capable of voluntary bargaining. 
B.  Ontario Industrial Standards Act  
Ontario’s Industrial Standards Act provided for tripartite bodies consisting of employee, employer and 
government representatives to be established for individual sectors, defined on industry and geographic 
dimensions, to negotiate wages and working conditions that, if accepted by the government would become 
enforceable minimum standards applying to all employers and employees in the sector. 
Passed in 1935, the ISA was the product of myriad influences, including recent federal and 
provincial government inquiries into competition in particular industries, with attention given to evidence 
of excessive competition and unacceptable wage and labour standards in those industries,42 and legislation 
in other jurisdictions providing for establishment of industrial or trade codes setting minimum standards43or 
juridical extension of collective agreements.44 The public had been pressuring Canadian governments to 
adopt fair wages and price codes, as had recently been established by the US National Industrial Recovery 
Act, and some businesses sought curbs on unfair competition.45 Meanwhile, the labour movement lacked 
consensus at that time on the issue of statutory minimum wages. Some unions, although supportive of such 
legislation, were concerned that minimum standards might, in effect, define the wage ceiling. Others 
regarded such legislation as a threat to the role of unions.46  
The year after the ISA was introduced it underwent review and was substantially amended in 1936 
and 1937, with the key effect of clearly reorienting the legislation from “fair wage” to “minimum standards” 
                                                            
39 EPA 1975, supra, note 34, §§ 90-94 and Sched. 8. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 8, at 188.  
40 WCA 1979, supra note 3, §19(1).  
41 KAHN-FREUND, supra note 8, at 188. 
42 These inquiries were the 1934 Select Special House of Commons Committee on Price Spreads and Mass Buying 
which led to the Royal Commission on Price Spreads and the 1934 Standing Committee on Labour of the Ontario 
Legislative Assembly 1934.    
43 Alberta Department of Trade and Industry Act S.A. 1934, c. 33; National Industrial Recovery Act 1933, 15 
U.S.C. § 703 [NIRA]. 
44 COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO THE INDUSTRIAL STANDARDS ACT, REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO THE 
INDUSTRIAL STANDARDS ACT 4–6 (1963). Interestingly, these included the Quebec Collective Labour Agreements 
Extension Act, Q.C. 1934, c. 56 and the Cotton Manufacturing Industry (Temporary Provisions) Act 1934, 24 Geo. 5 
– 25 Geo. 5, c. 30 (Gr. Brit.), which amended the British Trade Boards Act. The Trade Boards Act, itself, is not 
identified by commentators as one of the ISA’s influences. 






regulation in nature.47 It was later substantially reviewed and amended in the early 1960s to, among other 
things, strengthen enforcement, broaden the range of regulated matters, administration, and definitions and 
alterations to sectors, then it was ultimately repealed in 2001 in the context of comprehensive amendments 
to the province’s Employment Standards Act.48 Note that the following description of the ISA system 
reflects the legislation as it existed at the time of its repeal in 2001.49 
The ISA offered a tripartite mechanism for sectoral regulation of wages and working conditions 
through “schedules” which applied to all employers and employees in a “zone” encompassing a particular 
industry within a specified geographic area.50 For industries subject to inter-provincial competition, zones 
were province-wide in scope.51 Utilizing a broad definition of “employee”, based on a worker being “in 
receipt of or entitled to wages”, the Act covered nonstandard workers and, specifically, included situations 
where the same person was an employee for one purpose and an employer for another under the Act.52  
The notion of tripartism incorporated in the ISA involved representation for employees, employers 
and the government. While the ISA included no mention of trade unions or collective agreements, unions 
commonly acted as employee representatives under the Act.53  
The standard-setting process was initiated by employers or employees in an industry – not by the 
government or Minister - within a particular region of the province, or anywhere in the province, petitioning 
the Minister of Labour to convene a “conference”. If the Minister accepted the petition, he would authorise 
an industrial standards officer (ISO) to convene a conference, at which employer and employee 
representatives would try to negotiate a “schedule” of matters relating minimum workplace standards.54 
The ISO acted as the representative of the Minister and government at these conferences. Schedules could 
include wages, hours of work, working days, vacation pay and overtime limits and overtime.55 The resulting 
schedules were often based on collective agreements that existed in the relevant industry.56  
Conference negotiations were not in the nature of collective bargaining. Described as a “wholly 
permissive statute,”57 employer representatives were not compelled to participate or to reach agreement, 
and the ISA provided no dispute resolution mechanism, nor did it impose a good faith obligation on 
representatives.   
                                                            
47 Mark Cox, The Limits of Reform: Industrial Regulation and Management Rights in Ontario, 1930–7, 68 CANADIAN 
HIST. REV. 552, 572–573 (1987). 
48 Ontario An Act to amend The Industrial Standards Act 1935, S.O. 1937, c. 32; Ontario An Act to amend The 
Industrial Standards Act 1935, S.O. 1936, c. 29. Repealed effective September 4, 2001: Employment Standards Act, 
2000, S.O. 2000, c. 41, §§ 144 (5), 145). 
49 Ontario, Industrial Standards Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.6 [ISA 1990]. 
50 Id. §§ 5, 6; Designation of Industries and Zones, O. Reg. 296/01 (Can.). 
51 Id. § 7(1)(e); Interprovincially Competitive Industries, O. Reg. 295/01 (Can.). Note that ISA § 23 prohibited 
schedules from applying to the agriculture and mining industries. 
52 Id. §§ 1, 12. 
53 COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO THE INDUSTRIAL STANDARDS ACT, supra note 44, at 1.  
54 ISA 1990, supra note 49, §§ 5, 8(1).    
55 Id. §§ 8, 9. 
56 Jonathan B. Eaton, Labour law reform for the new workplace: Bill 40 and beyond, 342 (1994) (LLM dissertation).  





Where the representatives were able to agree on a proposed schedule, the conference would submit 
it to the Minister through the ISO who had convened the conference.58 The state-involvement element of 
the tripartite character of ISA standard-setting appeared to largely take place outside of and following the 
conference negotiations and seemed to grant the state significant scope to unilaterally shape schedules. The 
Minister could direct the ISO to investigate labour conditions and practices in the industry, and the ISO 
could recommend variations to the proposed schedule.59 The Minister had authority to approve the proposed 
schedule if it had been approved by a “proper and sufficient representation of employers and employees” 
in the conference, “with such variations recommended by the [ISO] as the Minister considers desirable”.60 
Schedules that the Minister recommended to the Lieutenant in Council could be enacted as regulations in 
force “during pleasure” and applied to all employers and employees in the designated industry and zone.61 
Thereafter, the Director of Labour Standards in the Ministry of Labour had authority to unilaterally amend 
schedules62 although in practice employer and employee representatives had input into such changes.63  
In addition to establishing an array of minimum standards through enacted schedules, the ISA 
required employers subject to a schedule to keep records and to make them available for inspection.64 The 
ISA also provided protection for employees against retaliation and reinstatement as a possible remedy. It 
prohibited termination of threats of termination or discrimination against employees for testifying in ISA 
proceedings or participating in investigations. Remedies included reinstatement orders, which could include 
compensation for lost earnings and other employment benefits. These orders could be filed by the employee 
in superior court permitting the employee to pursue contempt proceedings for noncompliance, and these 
orders were not to be stayed where the employer appealed.65 
The tripartite conference process could be succeeded by a bipartite committee, an “Advisory 
Committee”, which would be formally responsible for administering and enforcing enacted schedules. This 
occurred where the approved schedule designated an advisory committee to assist in administration.66  In 
such cases, an Advisory Committee could be established by the Minister for each zone or group of zones 
for which a schedule had been approved. Advisory Committees were bipartite – not tripartite - bodies, 
composed of up to five members from employer and employee sides, serving three-year terms although the 
legislation did not set out the proportion of employer and employee representatives. Required to meet 
regularly, and at least once every three months, and Committee members’ expenses were paid by 
government.67   
                                                            
58 ISA 1990, supra note 49, § 8(2). 
59 Id. § 10(1). 
60 Id. § 10(2). 
61 Id. § 10(3). 
62 Id. § 7(1)(c). 
63 INTERCEDE, TORONTO ORGANIZATION FOR DOMESTIC WORKERS' RIGHTS, MEETING THE NEEDS OF VULNERABLE 
WORKERS: PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVED EMPLOYMENT LEGISLATION AND ACCESS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR 
DOMESTIC WORKERS AND INDUSTRIAL HOMEWORKERS (1993). 
64 ISA 1990, supra note 49, § 13; Ontario Duties of Employers and Advisory Committees, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 652, § 
2 [DEAC]. 
65 ISA 1990, id. §§ 19–21.  
66 Id. § 18(1). JOHN D. MCCAMUS, ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT ON AVOIDING DELAY AND MULTIPLE 
PROCEEDINGS IN THE ADJUDICATION OF WORKPLACE DISPUTES 34 (1995).  





Where an Advisory Committees was established, it could hear employer and employee complaints, 
could hire inspectors to investigate and enforce violations. These Committees had significant, particular, 
powers including the authority to issue permits for overtime work and to set a minimum wage rate that was 
below the rate set out in the schedule.68 Decisions of Advisory Committees could be appealed to the Director 
of Labour Standards for a final decision.69 Although not a statutory responsibility of Advisory Committee, 
it was the practice for Committees to make recommendations to the Minister about revising schedules.70 
Where an Advisory Committee was not established, the Director of Labour Standards remained responsible 
for administrative decisions about enacted schedules.71  
While the ISA lacked any form of compulsion with respect to establishing schedules, it did provide 
for enforcement of approved schedules. However, enforcement was not in the hands of Advisory 
Committees or the Ministry. Instead, violations of a schedule, order to pay wages, or the prohibition on 
retaliation, could only be prosecuted as provincial offences, requiring consent to prosecute from the 
Director of Labour Standards, and which could result in substantial fines and the possibility of 
imprisonment.72  
The structure of the ISA has been criticized as having several important shortcomings. In terms of 
composition and participation, the ISA did not address the proportion of employer and employee 
representation at conferences or advisory committees,73 nor did it include any means for compelling or 
encouraging participation – particularly by employers.74 Further, the Act provided no mechanism for 
breaking deadlocks in conference negotiations.75 Some commentators contend the ISA gave too much 
discretion to the Minister over the content of schedules76 and too much power to change schedules.77  
Moreover, there were long delays in approving and enacting schedules, with the result that schedules could 
be out of date by the time they approved by the Minister.78  
C.  Fair Labor Standards Act 
Enacted by the US federal government in 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act provided for minimum wage 
rates, overtime pay and protections for child labour for public and private sector workers.79 The legislation 
                                                            
68 ISA 1990 id. §§ 9(2), 18(4). 
69 Id. §§ 18; DEAC, supra note 64, §§ 5–10, 13. 
70 INTERCEDE, supra, note 63, at 33. 
71 MCCAMUS, supra note 66.  
72 ISA 1990, supra note 49, §§ 19–21. Violation of a schedule could result in a maximum fine of $50,000 for employers 
and $2000 for employees, upon conviction. If an employer defaulted on a fine, this could result in imprisonment for 
up to six months. An employer convicted of violating minimum wage rates were subject to an order to pay the Director 
of Labour Standards the amount of unpaid wages as a penalty in addition to any fine. It was at the Director’s discretion 
whether to direct all or part of the penalty amount to be forfeited to the Crown or to the relevant employee. The 
Director could also file a copy of an order for payment of wages in Superior court, or small claims court.   
73 INTERCEDE, supra, note 63, at 33. 
74 JUDY FUDGE, ERIC TUCKER, & LEAH VOSKO, THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT: MARGINALIZING WORKERS 272 
(2002). 
75 INTERCEDE, supra, note 63, at 33. 
76 EATON, supra note 56, at 346.  
77 INTERCEDE, supra, note 63, at 33. 
78 Id. 
79 FLSA 1938, supra note 2, §18 (where a state enacted minimum standards legislation providing greater protection 





required that tripartite “industry committees” be established “for each industry engaged in commerce or in 
the production of goods for commerce”, to recommend minimum wages for the relevant industry, within 
limits established by the FLSA.80 Although the FLSA remains in force, it has declined in prominence, with 
industry committees no longer used.   Therefore, this article addresses the early FLSA, as originally 
introduced in 1938. 
The FLSA was not the first minimum wage legislation in the United States, nor the first use of 
“wage boards”. For many decades before FLSA was passed there had been attempts to achieve state 
legislation addressing hours of work.81 Beginning in 1912, and prompted by dire economic and social 
conditions of many workers as well as by a series of federal and state government reports on inadequate 
wages and working standards, several states passed minimum wage laws.82 Nordlund describes three basic 
approaches taken by this state-level legislation: a statutory flat minimum wage rate applying to all workers; 
creation of a commission to recommend minimum wage rates based on consideration of a living wage and 
business conditions, which covered women and children only, and which was not compulsory; and, most 
commonly adopted, was a version of the second approach which considered only living wage and which 
produced compulsory, enforced minimum rates.83 The Depression provided further motivation for the 
FLSA, and the short-lived National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), the associated National Recovery 
Administration, and the corporate codes (which included minimum wage standards) established and 
administered under that system, were influential forerunners to the FLSA.84 
Given the apparent influence of the NIRA on the FLSA, and the distinction between collective 
bargaining under the 1935 National Labour Relations Act and the type of non-bargaining collective 
regulation provided by NIRA, it appears that the FLSA was also intended to play a role in labour and 
employment regulation that was distinct from that of collective bargaining regulation.   
The FLSA’s definitions of “employee”, “employer” and “employ” are broad, and distinctly broader 
than similar definitions in contemporary Canadian minimum standards legislation and common law 
definitions of these terms.85 These definitions turn on the definition of “employer”, which explicitly 
contemplated including both direct and indirect relationships, with “employ” defined as “includes to suffer 
or permit to work”. “Employee” was simply defined as “includes any individual employed by an employer.” 
Based on a review of the FLSA’s legislative history of the FLSA, Professor Kati Griffith contends that 
these broad definitions were intentional.86 She argues that that legislators understood and foresaw the 
dangers of narrow definitions which might permit or encourage businesses to “splinter” or “fissure” their 
operations to avoid the statute. Moreover, legislators anticipated changing business structures and 
relationships over time. In Griffith’s view: 
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[T]he message that the legislative history communicates is that the FLSA’s regulatory power should 
reach all businesses responsible, directly or indirectly, for baseline wage standards, regardless of the 
forms those businesses take, or of the self-serving formalities they impose.87  
In particular, she points out that there is no reference to the concept of “control” as a factor for determining 
scope of application in either the text of the FLSA or its legislative history, and contents that the original 
understandings and intention of these FLSA definitions should be applied today to assist with applying 
FLSA standards to evolving and fissured business arrangements.88  
The FLSA provided a Presidentially-appointed Administrator to direct the newly-created Wage and 
Hour Division in the Department of Labor.89 Then, “As soon as practicable” thereafter, the Administrator 
was to appoint an Industry Committee “for each industry engaged in commerce or in the production of 
goods for commerce.”90 Industry Committees were tripartite – composed of equal numbers of “disinterested 
persons representing the public”, employers and employees in the industry. However, the number of 
representatives was not specified. In appointing Committee members, the Administrator was directed to 
give due regard to the geographic regions in which the industry is carried on.91 One of the public 
representatives was designated as chair by the Administrator. Committee members were reimbursed for 
expenses and a given per diem payment. The Administrator was required to provide Committees with 
“adequate” legal and office.92 Commentators noted that, Industry Committees were often large and that this 
large size was an impediment, yet significant concerns existed about the true representativeness of different 
unions, non-union workers, organized and unorganized employers, public members, and different 
geographic industrial regions, on these Committees.93 Appointing employee representatives reflecting the 
relevance of different trade unions and also providing for sufficient representation for unorganized workers 
were recognized as challenges early on. The Administrator sought to appoint unionist Committee members 
proportionate to the relative strength of the relevant union.94 However, Golding noted that “Any failure to 
achieve proportional representation has been of little significance since representatives of different unions 
have always agreed on the wage determinations which should be adopted.”95 At least in the early period, 
the Administrator concluded that union officials were appropriate representatives of unorganized workers 
on Committees.96  
The basic task of Industry Committees was to make recommendations to the Administrator about 
minimum wage rates which would inform resulting Wage Orders.97 Recommendations could be made for 
the industry as a whole, or the Committee could recommend reasonable classifications within an industry, 
provided that these classifications: “(1) will not substantially curtail employment in such classification and 
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(2) will not give a competitive advantage to any group in the industry, and shall recommend for each 
classification in the industry the highest minimum wage rate which the committee determines will not 
substantially curtail employment in such classification.”98 Moreover, classifications on the basis of age or 
sex were prohibited.99  
On convening an Industry Committee, the Administrator would refer to it the question of the 
minimum wage rate or rates to apply to the industry. The Committee was to investigate conditions in the 
industry, and this could include hearing witnesses and other evidence. Based on these investigations the 
Committee would make a recommendation to the Administrator about the “highest minimum wage rates 
for the industry which it determines, having due regard to economic and competitive conditions, will not 
substantially curtail employment in the industry.”100  
The Administrator was required to provide Industry Committees with “such data as he may have 
available on the matters referred to it, and shall cause to be brought before it in connection with such matters 
any witnesses whom he deems material.” Industry Committees could also “summon other witnesses or call 
upon the Administrator to furnish additional information to aid it in its deliberations.”101 
The key constraint on Committees’ recommendations was the statutory requirement to avoid 
“substantially curtailing employment”.102 Quorum was two-thirds of the members of the Industry 
Committee, and decisions were taken by a vote of “note less than a majority of all its members.”103 It 
appears that lack of consensus among Committee members was not a significant problem, with reports that 
in more than half the cases, recommendations were unanimously supported by Committee members.104 
There is no indication that public interest members were intended to perform the tie-breaking role of 
independent members of British Wages Councils.   
Committee recommendations were contained in reports filed with the Administrator who would 
then give notice to interested parties who had an opportunity to be heard on the recommendations. 
Thereafter, if the Administrator “finds that the recommendations are made in accordance with the law, are 
supported by the evidence adduced at the hearing, and, taking into consideration the same factors as are 
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The FLSA also specified several mandatory considerations for both Committees and the Administrator in deciding 
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“(1) competitive conditions as affected by transportation, living and production costs; 
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required to be considered by the industry committee, will carry out the purposes of this section; otherwise 
he shall disapprove such recommendations.”105  
Where the Administrator did not approve a Committee’s recommendation, the Administrator was 
required to refer the matter back to the Committee, “or to another industry committee (which he may appoint 
for the purpose), for further consideration and recommendation.”106   
Wage Orders took effect after publication in the Federal Register,107 and were to expire after seven 
years after the effective date of § 6 of the FLSA, and no order was to be issued thereafter or after expiry for 
an industry “unless the industry committee by a preponderance of the evidence before it recommends, and 
the Administrator by a preponderance of the evidence adduced at the hearing finds, that the continued 
effectiveness or the issuance of the order, as the case may be, is necessary in order to prevent substantial 
curtailment of employment in the industry.”108 Wage Orders could be challenged by “any person aggrieved” 
by the order, by way of judicial review, although the scope for review was limited by the statute.109 
Wage Orders were enforceable in the courts, with substantial fines available and, in the case of 
subsequent offences, the potential for both fines and imprisonment for not more than six months. Employers 
would also be liable to affected employees for both the amount of the unpaid minimum wage and an 
additional equal amount as liquidated damages, as well as a reasonable attorney fee and costs of the 
action.110   
II.  Constituting a Sectoral Standard-Setting Mechanism 
The preceding outline of three different approaches to sectoral standard-setting mechanism for the 
workplace (British wages councils, Ontario’s Industrial Standards conferences, and FLSA wage boards in 
the US) prompts three sets of considerations. First, whether to adopt a sectoral standard-setting approach 
to establishing terms and conditions of work, is a question that is outside the scope of this article. Second, 
if a workplace standard-setting mechanism is to be adopted, where should it be conceptually located within 
the overall labour /industrial/workplace relations system. Finally, consideration of whether these early 
models are instructive in terms of how a sectoral standard-setting mechanism addressing today’s 
workplaces might be configured. A comparative examination of key elements of the three approaches may 
be helpful to this enquiry (also see Table 1, below). 
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A.  Conceptual Location 
One set of considerations is where a sectoral standard-setting mechanism would be located within 
the overall system of workplace regulation, involving collective bargaining, individual negotiations and 
direct standard-setting by the state, and whether to design it as a permanent mechanism, or as a temporary 
support to assist employers and employees and the organizations to gain capacity to shift to more 
independent forms of standard-setting such as voluntary negotiations or collective bargaining. Workplace 
regulation involving successive, “staged”,112 “graduated”,113 or “gradated”114 of collective representation 
and bargaining, as it has variously been labelled, have appeared in the literature for many years. Some 
explicitly link staged or gradated access to representation and bargaining at the workplace to sectoral level 
representation, negotiation and bargaining. 115 
One commentator has described the role of wages councils as “a hybrid form between statutory 
wage regulation and voluntary bargaining.”116 Howell characterizes the wages council system as an 
example of “the now familiar role of the British state in creating or encouraging industry bargaining 
institutions rather than directly regulating outcomes”117 and describes a “hierarchy” of industry-level 
bargaining systems, including: voluntary collective bargaining covered industries where labor and 
employers were sufficiently organized; an extension procedure provided an additional enforcement 
mechanism for industry agreements;118 and wages councils, which mimicked collective bargaining, 
operated in industries where industrial actors were too weakly organized to create voluntary bargaining.”119 
JICs were located between wages councils and traditional collective bargaining in this spectrum. Wages 
councils and JICs were conceived of transitional bodies, and as means to launch parties into independent, 
collective standard-setting, whether that be in the form of voluntary collective bargaining or non-bargaining 
collective negotiations and to supplement the collective bargaining system. 
In contrast, the ISA system was intended not to be a supplement to the collective bargaining system 
but to operate as a parallel system, with no explicit role for unions or collective bargaining. Although it did 
provide for development of conferences into advisory committees, this was not regarded as either a means 
of developing independent negotiations or collective bargaining capacity for employer and employee 
representatives.   Meanwhile, the FLSA explicitly mentions unions and, while it intended wage boards to 
be temporary bodies, this temporariness was of a different character than under either the wages council or 
ISA systems.  The FLSA did not provide any form of staged development towards independent standard-
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setting by employers and employees, and was clearly not intended to foster workplace parties’ 
independence or to transform into collective bargaining. 
A final consideration in this regard is whether sectoral standard-setting mechanisms would satisfy 
– and are perhaps necessary to satisfy – freedom of association requirements for access to the process of 
collective bargaining for vulnerable workers for whom access to statutory collective bargaining, absent 
some form of government support or structure, is effectively nonexistent.120 
B.  Elements of a sectoral standard-setting approach 
Although the three models contain similar elements, the particular approach to each often differed 
significantly, notably in terms of the breadth of coverage of types of workers and work relationships, 
breadth of standards addressed, composition of the body, presence and form of dispute resolution for the 
body, and, enforcement. 
i.  Breadth of coverage: worker/employee 
Notable among the three systems outlined in this article is that each incorporated broader conceptions of 
the forms of work relationships that were to be covered, than those included in modern common law and 
statutory labour and employment systems in Canada. Not only did each cover contractors in addition to 
more traditional employees, but each had broad understandings of the concept of the employer. The FLSA 
appears to have been particularly forward-looking in its effort to capture future developments in business 
organization and to foil business’ efforts to avoid regulation through creative structuring of the organization. 
The FLSA was intended to address the fissured and chain/pyramid structures that have posed such a 
challenge to modern workplace regulation.121 
ii. Range	of	workplace	standards	
An important consideration is the range of workplace standards that could be addressed by a sectoral 
standard-setting body. British Wages Councils (responsible for remuneration, terms and conditions of work 
and with specific limitations only on holidays and holiday remuneration) and ISA conferences (wages and 
conditions of work) had broad scope of influence, in contrast with FLSA Wage Boards which were limited 
to addressing minimum wages.  An additional limitation on FLSA Wage Boards discretion was the statutory 
requirement that minimum wage recommendations be assessed against anticipated effects on 
employment.122 No such mandatory considerations applied under the other systems. 
iii. Composition	of	standard‐setting	body	&	tripartism	
A challenge identified in each system was adequate representation of non-unionized employees. In each 
case, it appears that unions typically acted as worker representatives.123 A second consideration is number 
of representatives and the overall size of the standard-setting body. Only with FLSA wage boards, which 
commonly included 20 or more members, was excessive size a concern.  
A related issue is the nature of tripartism that is adopted. Each of the three systems examined in 
this article involve a tripartite structure.124 However, they represent different approach to this concept. All 
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involved representatives of employers and employees, and unions generally ended up acting as employee 
representatives. However, the systems incorporate different approaches to the third party: Wages Councils 
utilized independent members, ISA conferences involved an Industrial Standards Officer as representative 
of the Minister and the State, and the FLSA incorporated “public” representatives.  
iv. Autonomy 
A significant difference among the three systems is found in the degree of autonomy they held. British 
wages councils had statutory authority to issue legally enforceable orders. In contrast both ISA conferences 
and FLSA wage boards were making recommendations to the government and the government had 
significant authority to reject or modify the recommendations. The FLSA included several additional 
features which likely had the effect of limiting wage boards’ autonomy: the government could cancel and 
replace a wage board at any point, wage board minimum wage rates were subject to judicial review that 
could be initiated by a member of the public, and any resulting wage order was of statutorily limited 
duration. All three systems provided for a form of public or industrial community transparency, in the form 
of requiring public hearings, notice or input into proposed orders or recommendations. In the case of the 
FLSA the input into recommendations included a heavy emphasis on calling evidence and witnesses to 
inform the boards’ recommendation. 
One challenge for tripartite sectoral standard-setting bodies is ensuring participation of employers 
and their representatives. While lack of employer participation was a long-standing problem with ISA 
conferences, it does not appear that is was a difficulty encountered by British wages councils.125 The 
difference likely lies in the inherent incentive to participate that existed in wages councils. As wages 
councils had authority to directly issue legally binding orders, if employers did not participate they faced 
the prospect of becoming subject to orders that they had not participated in developing. 
In contrast, under the ISA system, there was little incentive for employers to participate, or to 
participate constructively. As discussed below, the ISA system provided no way to break a deadlock if a 
conference was unable to come to agreement. Further, even if employer and employee representatives came 
to agreement, the Minister could delay, reject, or unilaterally modify the standards. Unlike under the wages 
council system, there was little prospect under the ISA that if employers did not participate that they would 
become subject to sectoral standards. 
v.      Dispute resolution procedure 
Where members of the standard-setting body could not come to agreement, the British wages council 
system provided for the option of voting-by-sides, and contemplated that independent members would act 
as tie-breakers. Reportedly, rarely did this have to be resorted to.126 The relative autonomy and authority of 
wages councils demanded some means of breaking deadlocks. This is in contrast to the other systems, 
which lacked dispute resolution mechanisms. 
vi. Enforcement and inspection 
Enforcement and associated investigations are key elements of any scheme of workplace regulation, and 
any configuration depends on sufficient resources to be effective. The broadest provision for enforcement 
was provided by the UK wages council system. Government inspections were supplemented by options for 
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either civil or criminal enforcement. Notably, the civil, contract law, enforcement route arose from the 
incorporation of works council orders into individual contracts of employment.   
Notably the ISA system relied on inspections which were historically underfunded.127 Moreover, 
enforcement was by means of a provincial offences proceeding, which is a costly, cumbersome process 
which the individual worker is responsible for pursuing. 
III.  Conclusion: Returning to the 21st Century 
Segments of the 21st century workplace demonstrate significant parallels to the early 20th century, with 
severely depressed compensation, poor working conditions, isolated and dispersed workers, with little 
prospect for access to collective bargaining. For workers in these sectors, a sectoral standard-setting 
mechanism may be an important opportunity.  
This approach is one that various jurisdictions have experimented with in the past. Looking 
forward, there is value in considering whether elements of these different approaches may be drawn upon 
to construct a wage board for the 21st century. In particular, consideration may be given to ensuring a broad 
definition of employee and employer, permitting determination of a wide range of terms and conditions of 
work, including a dispute resolution mechanism for body decision-making, and incorporating structural 
features permitting and encouraging the parties to develop capacity to independently negotiate or bargain 
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